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The Right of Nonrepatriation of Prisoners
of War Captured by the United States
The development of international legal standards for the proper
treatment of prisoners of war has historically involved controversy
over repatriation at the end of hostilities. The main conflict has
been between the obligation to return all captives to the authorities
of their native states and the right to retain those who desired not
to be repatriated.
Although a recognized duty of captor states to return prisoners
developed first, by the end of World War I a countervailing state
right not to repatriate those who did not want to be returned was
incorporated into many peace treaties and repatriation conventions.'
The Geneva Convention of 19292 did not speak explicitly to the
problem, however, nor was practice following World War II uni-
form. Some nation states allowed prisoners the choice to remain in
the captor state, either due to a shortage of manpower or to fulfill
promises given to encourage surrender.3 More often, such election
was not granted the captured combatants with the result that many
were retained against their will. Others were repatriated without an
opportunity to exercise such election, with the consequence that
1. The Russian repatriation conventions paid significant attention to this principle.
See, e.g., Agreement Between His Majesty's Government and the Soviet Government of
Russia for the Exchange of Prisoners, Feb. 12, 1920, art. 4, CINm. No. 587, at 2 (1920),
1 L.N.T.S. 264, 265; Agreement Between Germany and the Soviet Union with Regard
to the Mutual Repatriation of Prisoners of War and Interned Civilians, Apr. 19, 1920,
art. 1, 2 L.N.T.S. 66, 67. For a summary of other similar reservations in Russian
conventions executed at the close of World War I, see Oral Report of Secretary of
State Dean Acheson before the Political and Sec. Comm. of the U.N. General As-
sembly, Oct. 24, 1952, in D. ACimsON, THE PROBLEM OF KOREA 35-39 (Dep't of State
Int'l Organization and Conference Series III, No. 88, 1952). The Allies also incor-
porated the right not to repatriate prisoners into peace treaties and repatriation
conventions. See, e.g., Treaty of Versailles, done June 28, 1919, art. 220, 11 Martens
Nouveau Recueil (ser. 3) 323, 474; Peace Treaty of St. Germain en Laye, Sept. 10,
1919, art. 166, [1919] Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 11, at 37; Peace Treaty of Trianon, June 4, 1920,
art. 150, [1920] Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 10, at 36; Agreement Between Germany and Latvia
Concerning the Exchange of their Respective Prisoners, Apr. 20, 1920, art. 1, 2 L.N.T.S.
70, 75.
2. Convention of July 27, 1929, Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
done July 27, 1929, art. 75, 47 Stat. 2021, 2055 (1932), T.S. No. 846, 118 L.N.T.S. 343,
387 [hereinafter cited as Geneva Convention of 1929].
3. Charmatz & Wit, Repatriation of Prisoners of War and the 1949 Geneva Con-
vention, 62 YALE L.J. 391, 401 (1953).
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many prisoners, fearful of returning home, committed suicide.4 It
was the retention of captives against their will, however, which was
the most recurrent problem; and in order to prohibit it more force-
fully, the repatriation provision in the Geneva Convention on pris-
oners of war of 1949 was altered to read: "Prisoners of war shall
be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of ac-
tive hostilities."
' '
Notwithstanding the Convention, the issue of repatriation re-
mained unresolved, as became evident during the negotiations to end
the Korean War. Demands by thousands of prisoners of war held
by the United Nations Command that they not be repatriated led to
a dispute between communist and United Nations negotiators which
prolonged the negotiations for a year. After the armistice agreement,
which included a settlement of the immediate issue, there was no
significant repatriation controversy involving the United States until
the recent exchange of prisoners in the Vietnam War. Though the
issue was not as fully contested as in Korea, there was evidence that
some communist captives in South Vietnam expressed the desire not
to be repatriated to the North. The Saigon government, for example,
released from 10,000 to 20,000 prisoners instead of repatriating them
in compliance with the terms of the cease-fire accord;" and the In-
ternational Committee of the Red Cross, which interviewed pris-
oners of war still held after the earlier release, found many who
did not desire to be repatriated.7 The uncertainty surrounding the
return of communist prisoners at the formal end of hostilities in
Vietnam suggests once again the unsettled status of the practice of
repatriation. It also underscores the need for the United States to
reevaluate its international obligations in regard to this issue.
The Korean controversy two decades ago centered on the right
of a state to grant the request of a prisoner of war not to be re-
patriated. At that time neither the United States, which was a force-
ful advocate of that right, nor the global community at large recog-
4. Comment on Art. 68, Part IV, in INTERNATIONAL CoMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS,
COMMISSION OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS FOR THE STUDY OF CONVENTIONS FOR THE PRO-
IECTION OF WVAR VICTIMS: PRELIMINARY DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMIrFEE OF THE RED CROSS 92 (1947) [hereinafter cited as PRELIMINARY DOCUMENTS].
5. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12,
1919, done Aug. 12, 1949, art. 118, para. 1, [1955] 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75
U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter cited as the Geneva Convention]. The Geneva Convention of
1929 had proven unsatisfactory because prisoners could be detained until a peace
treaty was signed, a formality sometimes omitted and usually delayed after the end
of hostilities.
6. N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1973, at 1, col. 8 (city ed.).
7. N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1973, at 14, col. 1 (city ed.).
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nized the right of the prisoner himself to refuse repatriation. Such
an extension, however, is a necessary final step to complete the pro-
tection of the individual captive.
A personal right in international law is usually a benefit which
inures to an individual. The term, however, sometimes has a sec-
ondary meaning, vital in this context, as a choice which can be
personally invoked. Many individual protections can only be as-
serted by a person's native state, which retains discretion over whether
and to what extent to assert the right in each particular case. The
personal right of a prisoner of war to refuse repatriation will not
be meaningful, however, unless the right may be invoked by the
prisoner himself.
The convergence of international law and the policies of the United
States suggests that the American government is obligated to respect
a right of nonrepatriation when it is asserted by a prisoner of war
who can reasonably claim that he would be persecuted for his be-
liefs, race, or status if he were returned to his native state or to the
group to which he was attached at the time of his capture.
This right arises from three interrelated sources. The Geneva Con-
vention of 1949 guaranteed each prisoner of war the personal right
to be repatriated, a right which should be interpreted as an option
that the prisoner may refuse to exercise. The Convention on the
Status of Refugees of 19518 and its subsequent Protocol of 19679
prohibit all contracting states from returning any refugee to ter-
ritory where his life or liberty would be threatened on account of
his beliefs, race, or status. The prisoner of war refusing repatriation
for these reasons brings himself within the terms of the Refugee
Convention since he may sever his ties with his native state, even
while held in captivity. Finally, principles of customary international
law which have developed after the Second World War support the
prisoner of war's claim: that an alien should not be returned to ter-
ritory where he would be persecuted, and that an individual has
standing in the international arena to assert personal rights.
I. The Geneva Convention of 1949
The Geneva Convention of 1949 Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War'0 (the Geneva Convention), effective on October
8. Done July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
9. Done Jan. 31, 1967, [1968] 19 U.S.T. 6224, T.I.A.S. No. 6557.
10. Geneva Convention, supra note 5. The Convention had been ratified or acceded
to by 123 nations by the spring of 1970. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE
368 (1973).
Vol. 83: 358, 1973
Nonrepatriation of Prisoners of War
21, 1950, and ratified by the United States in 1955, deals in Part
Four with the termination of captivity: "Prisoners of war shall be
released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active
hostilities.""
During the negotiations after the Korean War the communist na-
tions advocated a literal interpretation of this paragraph, contending
that the words of the Convention were self-explanatory. 12 Such a
view has been rejected with respect both to treaty interpretation in
general and to the interpretation of this specific treaty.'3 The in-
terpretation of a treaty must weigh many factors other than the
normal meanings of the words taken out of context. Among the
most important of these factors is the general purpose of the con-
vention: The proper interpretation is one "which is logical, rea-
sonable and most likely to accord with and to effectuate the larger
general purpose which the parties desired the treaty to serve."'14
Other factors which must also be considered are the history of the
document, the subsequent conduct of the parties in applying its
provisions, changes in relevant circumstances, the signatories' major
expectations, and the development of pertinent international law
norms.
15
11. Gencva Convention, art. 118, para. I.
12. See Speeches of A.Y. Vyshinsky before the United Nations Committee for the
Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, Oct. 29, 1952, Nov. 10, 1952, in Reports of
the U.N. Comm. for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, 7 U.N. GAOR, 1st
Comm. 37, 89 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Vyshinsky Speech].
13. Harvard Research in International Law commented, in regard to its Draft Con-
tention on the Law of Treaties, that the process of interpretation, rightly conceived,
cannot be regarded as a mere mechanical one of drawing inevitable meanings
from the words in a text or of searching for and discovering some preexisting spe-
cific intention of the parties with regard to every situation arising under a treaty.
It is precisely because the words used in an instrument rarely have exact and
single meanings, and because all situations which may arise under it cannot be,
or at least are not, foreseen and expressly provided for by the parties at the time
of its drafting, that the necessity for interpretation occurs.
Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties
(Comment on Art. 19), 29 Am. J. INT'L L. Supp. 653, 946 (1935) [hereinafter cited as
Harvard Research]. See also Charmatz & Wit, supra note 3, at 396. The Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 22, 1969, 63 Am. J. INT'L
L. 875, 8 Ixv'L LEGAL MATERIALS 679 (1969), attempted to codify, among other things,
the rules on interpretation. Only 32 nations have signed the document, however, and
its failure to attract a substantial number of important signatories has rendered it a
dead letter for the time being. See T. Yoo, Tim KOREAN WVAR AND TIHE UNITED NATIONS
172 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Yoo], for the view that the repatriation clause of the
Convention is especially open to nonliteral interpretation.
1.1. Harvard Research 946. See Case Concerning the Application of the Convention
of 1902 Governing the Guardianship of Infants (The Boll Case) (Netherlands v. Sweden),
[1958] I.C.J. 55.
15. Harvard Research 948-70. See Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for
States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Not-
withstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), [1971] I.C.J. 3, 31-32 [hereinafter
cited as Namibia Case]; Charmatz & Wit, supra note 3, at 397; McDougal & Gardner,
The Veto and the Charter: An Interpretation for Survival, 60 YALE L.J. 258, 262-69,
278-83 (1951).
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A. History and General Purpose
The history of the Geneva Convention and its general purpose
are inseparably intertwined. The Geneva Convention of 1929 had
proved ineffective in preventing the suffering of prisoners of war
during World War 11.16 To prevent the repetition of past mistreat-
ment the drafters of the Geneva Convention of 1949 established
the humanitarian protection of the individual prisoner and his per-
sonal rights as the general purpose of the Convention. Authoritative
commentary on the Convention by the International Committee of
the Red Cross specifically pointed out that the Convention was
concerned with "protecting the individual against abusive use of
force," not with guaranteeing the rights of states.' 7 The provisions
of the Convention specifically refer to individual rights's and sug-
gest that any interpretation of the Convention should, in compliance
with the general purpose of the agreement, improve the condition
of the prisoners and in no way lessen the rights accrued. The latter
point is bolstered by Articles Six and Seven, which specifically pro-
hibit any diminution of the prisoners' individual rights, and by Ar-
ticles Six and Nine, which envisage improvement in their condition
through channels outside the Convention.'"
16. See p. 359 supra.
17. INTERNATIONAL COMI'rIIEE OF TiE RED CROSS, FIvE LESSONS ON TIlE GENEVA CON-
VENt ION 5 (J. Pictet ed. 1962) [hereinafter cited as FIvE LESSONS]. The Committee sum-
marized the individual's status under the Convention as follows:
[T]his part of the law of nations . . . is to a certain extent privileged . . . . It
authorizes and even recommends relationships between individuals, outside of any
political allegiance. As Max Huber more aptly put it, "from the strictly legal point
of view, a real human right has been created, by virtue of which the individual,
his integrity and dignity are defended in the name of a moral principle which
rises far above the limits of national law and of political considerations."
Id. at 18.
18. Among the articles specifically referring to individual rights are Article Six ("No
special agreement shall adversely . . . restrict the rights which [the Convention]
confers upon" the prisoners of war); Article Seven ("Prisoners of war may in no cir-
cumstances renounce in part or in entirety the rights secured to them by the present
Convention"); and Article 14 ("Prisoners of war . . . are entitled in all circumstances
to respect of their persons and their honour . . . [and] shall retain the full civil
capacity which they enjoyed at the time of their capture .... "). Other implicit per-
sonal guarantees include the rights to refuse to answer questions without being threat-
ened (Article 17), to send and receive at least two letters and four cards monthly
(Article 71), to practice one's religion, to undertake intellectual and educational pur-
suits, to have opportunities for physical exercise (Articles 34-38), and to make com-
plaints without fear of reprisal (Article 78). Article 109 further provides that "no
sick or injured prisoner of war who is eligible for repatriation . . . may be repatriated
against his will during hostilities" (Article 109).
19. See note 18 supra. Article 6 also provides that any other special agreements
made in compliance with the Convention shall continue as long as the Convention is
applicable or until "more favorable measures have been taken with regard [to the
prisoners] by one or other of the Parties to the Conflict." Article 9 states. "The
provisions of the present Convention constitute no obstacle to the humanitarian ac-
tivities which the International Committee of the Red Cross or any other impartial
humanitarian organization may . . . undertake for the protection of prisoners of war
or for their relief."
Nonrepatriation of Prisoners of War
Forced repatriation of prisoners would run counter to the guar-
antees provided by the Convention for two distinct reasons. First,
it would transform what were intended to be individual rights into
states' rights. If the captor state retained the power forcibly to re-
turn prisoners of war to their native authorities or if the native
state could demand such a return, repatriation as a personal right
of the prisoner would be supplanted. A personal right inures to the
benefit of the individual as an option, not as an unconditional ob-
ligation. To argue that the right to repatriation conferred on pris-
oners of war was really a right of native states to have prisoners re-
turned would be to change the entire subject of the Convention.
Such a view would imply that the prisoner of war is no more than
an agent of his state, one to whom guaranteed benefits were given
in order to protect the state itself.20 That interpretation would ig-
nore the many rights granted to the prisoners, such as freedom of
religion and the right to receive mail, which are guarantees meant
for the benefit of the individual. Thus, it would set up a dichotomy
of purpose and subject in the Convention which it in no way sup-
ports.2 '
Second, forced repatriation of a threatened prisoner would not
serve to improve his condition in a humanitarian way, as was in-
tended with respect to all articles of the Convention. If a prisoner
of war has credible reasons for believing he would be persecuted
upon being returned to his native state, it cannot realistically be as-
serted that an interpretation of Article 118 conceding an absolute
right in the captor state to repatriate the prisoner against his will is
consistent with the purpose of the Convention. In sum, forced re-
patriation by the United States would be a violation of the Geneva
Convention's purpose and of rights which as a signatory it owes to
the individual prisoner.
B. Subsequent Conduct of Parties to the Convention
The conduct of the nations now party to the Geneva Convention
supports an interpretation according the prisoner of war a right to
20. These opposing "ie 2s of Article 118 played a role in the Korean War nego-
tiations. Communist spokesmen claimed that Article Seven prevented the prisoner of
war from renouncing any rights granted to him and hence that the captor state could
enforce the exercise of the right of repatriation. Yoo, supra note 13, at 172. Emphasis
on the continued role of the captured combatant as a representative of his country
was stressed by the Soviet Union in the United Nations through the speeches of A.Y.
Vyshinsky. Vyshinsky Speech, supra note 12. The United Nations Command took the
opposing view that "the Convention was a decree of human rights for the prisoners
• • and forced repatriation would be in complete contradiction to the humanitarian
principle . . .of protection for the individual." United Nations Command Report to
the Seventh General Assembly, in FIVE LESSONS, supra note 17, at 71.
21. Yoo 172.
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refuse repatriation for fear of danger to his life or liberty. Shortly
after the Convention's adoption, the United Nations General As-
sembly sought to encourage the release of many prisoners still held
by captor states after World War II. The General Assembly's reso-
lution on that occasion is significant in that it specifically categorized
the right of repatriation recently agreed to as an opportunity, not an
obligation, thereby suggesting that a prisoner could elect not to be
returned.
22
The controversy surrounding interpretation of the Geneva Con-
vention during the negotiations following the Korean War has pro-
vided the most important discussion to date of the correct interpre-
tation of the Convention's articles on repatriation. Many prisoners
of war held by the United Nations Command had expressed the
belief that they would be persecuted if repatriated and had stated
that they would violently resist such return.23 The Command, with
the unanimous agTeement of the governments which had forces in
Korea, decided it would not forcibly repatriate these captives. The
United Nations Command maintained this policy throughout the
negotiations, claiming that "all prisoners must be released but only
those should be repatriated or turned over to the other side who
can be delivered without the application of force." 24 When this posi-
tion was rejected by the communist negotiators, the debate concern-
ing the proper interpretation of the Geneva Convention was taken
to the General Assembly and fully debated. The result was an In-
22. The General Assembly called
upon all governments still having control of [war victims] to act in conformsity
with the recognized standards of international conduct and with the [Geneva
Convention] which require that, upon the cessation of active hostilities, all pris-
oners should, with the least possible delay, be given the unrestricted opportunity
of repatriation.
Measures for the Peaceful Solution of the Problem of Prisoners of War, G.A. Res.
427, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. 20, at 45, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950) (emphasis added).
It is also significant that the General Assembly acknowledged the role of "recog-
nized standards of international conduct" with regard to repatriation. See pp. 377-82
infra.
23. Enclosure in letter from Secretary of State J.F. Dulles to the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, March 29, 1955, in Hearings on the Geneva Conventions for the
Protection of War Victims Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess. 65-66 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on the Geneva Conventions].
24. Forty-Fifth Report of the United Nations Command Operation in Korea, 27
DEP'T STATE BULL. 272-73 (1952).
The wording of Article 118 that the prisoners were to be "released and repatriated"
was thus seized upon by the governments to substantiate their belief that release was
required but repatriation was not. Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy stated,
Article 118 .. . indicates that the prisoner is to be released immediately after
the cessation of hostilities.
We, however, are of the opinion that the prisoner has the right of asylum and
that the detaining power has the discretion which will not oblige it to forcibly
repatriate the prisoner of war.
Hearings on the Geneva Conventions, supra note 23, at 22.
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dian draft resolution which was adopted by a vote of 54 to 5 with
one abstention.2 5 This resolution was noteworthy in three respects.
First, it denied the policy of forced repatriation while adhering to
the requirements of the Geneva Convention. Second, it referred to
the "general spirit of the Convention" as a factor to be considered
in applying its terms. Finally, it recognized the concurrent role of
"well-established principles and practice of international law" in de-
ciding any questions concerning repatriation.
The eventual agreement on Korean War prisoners incorporated
most of the General Assembly's views,", the signatories specifically
agreeing to elective repatriation.27 A Neutral Nation's Repatriation
Commission was established to process all prisoner of war decisions
on repatriation and to take custody of those not desiring to be re-
turned.25 The agreement sought to maximize the discretion left to
the individual captive through provisions that prevented repatria-
tion from being the routine practice. According to its terms the right
of repatriation had to be affirmatively asserted by the individual;
it was not an automatic procedure which would be followed unless
the prisoner objected. 29 Those prisoners who did not affirmatively
elect repatriation were released to civilian status after 120 days if
the Commission did not determine that they actually preferred to
be returned.3
0
The application of and declarations concerning the Convention
by the global community during the Korean War thus reflected an
acceptance of the concept that the prisoner of war had a right not
to be forcibly repatriated. The communist nations originally did not
concur in this interpretation of the Convention, but they eventually
25. The General Assembly . . . 1. Affirms that the release and repatriation ofprisoners of war shall be effected in accordance with the Geneva Convention Rela-
tive to the Treatment of Prisoners of War .. . [,] the well-established principles
and practice of international law and the relevant provisions of the draft armistice
agreement. 2. Affirms that force shall not be used against prisoners of war to
prevent or effect their return to their homelands, and that they shall at all times
be treated humanely in accordance with the specific provisions of the Geneva
Convention and with the general spirit of the Convention.
G.A. Res. 610, 7 U.N. GAOR Supp. 20, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/2361 (1952).
26. Text of Agreement on Prisoners of War (Korean War), 28 DEP'T STATE BULL.
866 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Prisoner Agreement].
27. Id. sec. I, para. 3, at 866.
28. Id. sec. 1, para. I, at 866.
29. The agreement stipulated that "[w]ithin two months after the armistice agree-
ment becomes effective, both sides shall . . . directly repatriate . . . all those prisoners
of war in its custody who insist on repatriation to the side to which they belonged
at the time of capture." Id. Preamble.
30. "The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall declare the relief from
the prisoner of war status to civilian status of any prisoners of war who have not
exercised their right to be repatriated and for whom no other disposition has been
agreed to by the political conference within 120 days .. I.." d  sec. 4, para. 11, at 867.
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accepted and acted in accordance with the principle in the Armi-
stice Agreement of 1953.31
C. Changes in Circumstances
Any covenant intended to apply to circumstances likely to change
must be construed in a liberal manner 32 and the Geneva Convention,
as the International Red Cross commentary pointed out, was espe-
cially intended to be so interpreted. 33 Important changes have taken
place since 1949 in the status of the individual in international af-
fairs and international conflicts which provide part of the frame-
work within which pertinent treaties should be interpreted.
The individual, from the time of the Geneva Convention, has
benefited from what Professor Myres McDougal terms the growth
in respect for human dignity in the international arena.3 4 The prog-
ress made in this direction is reflected in individual rights granted
by treaties such as the Geneva Convention and in an enhanced status
for the individual under international law. One result of individuals'
recently heightened mobility is a growing emphasis on political
awareness and the right freely to choose political affiliations and
allegiances.
The tendency to view modern wars as ideological rather than ter-
ritorial, another changed circumstance in international affairs, is also
a reflection of the growing possibility that the individual may side
with a new political order. Such an approach to warfare emphasizes
control over people and their attitudes; changes of political alle-
giances are at least as strongly stressed as the conquest of territory.
This change in approach extends to the treatment of prisoners of
war. Under traditional war practices, in terms of which the Geneva
Convention was written, there were often extensive efforts to en-
courage desertion among the enemy's combatants but little effort to
alter allegiances among prisoners of war. International prescriptions
31. The declared end of hostilities in Vietnam did not resurrect this controversy
because the two sides chose not to make forced repatriation a serious issue. It is ap.
parent, however, that at least South Vietnam informally acted in accord with this
interpretation by releasing many prisoners before they were to be repatriated. North
Vietnamese failure to assert serious objection to this practice suggests some degree of
concurrence by that nation with such a practice.
32. See M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL, J. MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENiS
AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 98-100 (1967); Yoo, supra note 13, at 171.
33. Fiv LEssoNs, supra note 17, at 17.
34. See McDougal, Perspectives for an International Law of Human Dignity, 1959
PROC. AM. Soc. INT'L L. 107, 114-15. Human dignity is a principle which demands
protection for the individual, his freedom and right to justice, and requires policies
which offer him a maximum of choice and mobility. Id.
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relating to such prisoners were "applied on the assumption that a
given person [was] a prisoner who continue[d] to owe allegiance to
the captee state.' 3 With the advent of wars which the competing
governments viewed in ideological terms, however, that assumption
was no longer valid. The indoctrination of prisoners of war by captor
nations has become a common element of modern international con-
flicts; such a change must be taken into consideration in interpreting
the Geneva Convention. To engage in a policy of encouraging pris-
oners of war to alter their allegiances and forswear their native states
but to deny them a subsequent right to refuse repatriation would be
in accordance neither with the general purpose of the Geneva Con-
vention nor with the standards of equity which also play a role in
the interpretation of treaties.36
D. Expectations of the Parties
The expectations of the signatories to the Geneva Convention as
to its proper construction are largely the result of the factors men-
tioned above-history, subsequent conduct, and changed circumstances.
It is therefore unnecessary to deal with expectations as such in fur-
ther detail. It is sufficient to note that the United States, which
signed the covenant in 1955, became a party to the agreement at a
time when expectations concerning its interpretation were already
founded upon the document's previous application: the Korean
Armistice agreement that limited the forcible return of prisoners.
In addition, the global community, through the United Nations
General Assembly, had acknowledged that international law norms
would play a role in the application of the Convention. These norms,
as discussed below,37 today include the principle that an individual
who reasonably fears a threat to his life or liberty upon return to
his native state as the result of his race, religion, nationality, or
political opinion has a right to refuse forcible repatriation.
All of these factors-the history and general purpose of the Con-
vention, subsequent conduct of the signatories, changes in circum-
stances, expectations of the parties, and development of pertinent in-
ternational law norms-must be weighed together with the text of
the Geneva Convention in order to arrive at the most acceptable
35. Wilhelhn, Can the Status of Prisoners of War Be Altered?, REVUE INTERNATIONAL
DE Lk CROI\-Rou.E, July-Sept. 1953, at 20, quoted in R. HINcORANI, PRISONERS OF W%,AR
211 n.68 (1963) [hereinafter cited as HINGORANI].
36. See Mf. HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 103 (1944).
37. See pp. 369-77 infra.
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interpretation. Like any other treaty the agreement did not specifi-
cally detail its application to all fact situations;38 when it must be
38. It has been argued by past proponents of a narrow construction of the Con-
vention that the subject of forcible repatriation was specifically dealt with by the treaty
negotiators. This theory contended that the omission of a right to refuse repatriation
was intentional and meant to reflect the absence of such an option. See, e.g., Vyshinsky
Speech, supra note 12, at 37. This view was founded on the fact that the International
Committee of the Red Cross mentioned the subject in the preliminary documents which
it submitted to the commission of government experts convened to prepare a draft
convention. PRELIMINARY DocUMENTs, supra note 4, note to art. 68, part IV, at 178 n.4.
Although the government experts took "due note" of the International Committee's ob-
servations concerning repatriation of prisoners of war against their will, they did not
incorporate such a provision in their draft. INTERNAIlONAL COMMItEE OF THE RED CROss,
SUMMARY REPORT OF THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTs FOR TIlE
STUDY OF THE CONVENTIONS FOR THE PROTECTION OF WAR VICTis 95 (1947). The reasons
for this omission were later explained by the representative diplomats during the
Diplomatic Conference in Geneva in 1949. The major concern of the representatives
was that if such a right were specified, the captor state would be required to grant
permanent asylum-a conflict, they felt, with traditional state options in this area
and an invitation to massive immigration. See II-A FINAL RECORD OF TIlE DIPLOMATIC
CONFERENCE OF GENEVA 291; Il-B id. at 312-14 (1950); Charmatz & Wit, supra note 3,
at 403; HINGORANI, supra note 35, at 212; Yoo, supra note 13, at 174. Of particular
significance to the proponents of a narrow interpretation was the rejection by a large
majority of these diplomats of the Austrian amendment to Article 118, which would
have read in part, "Prisoners of War, however, shall be entitled to apply for their
transfer to any other cotntry which is ready to accept them." II-A, FINAL RECORD, supra
at 324, 462. This amendment had been proposed to ensure that "the prisoners of war
[would] have the option of not returning to their country if they so desire[d]." Id. at
462 n.42.
Such an attempt to explain the intent of the original negotiators fails to take ac-
count of the nature of these conference discussions and their limited applicability to
an interpretation of the final convention.
The significance of the diplomats' rejection of the Austrian proposal is easily mag-
nified beyond its proper scope. The rejection of a proposal by such a conference does
not mean that its opposite can be assumed as the voting parties' official position on
an issue. As the International Court of Justice has specifically ruled, "[T]he fact that
a particular proposal is not adopted by an international organ does not necessarily
carry with it the inference that a collective pronouncement is made in a sense op-
posite to that proposed. There can be many reasons determining rejection or non-
approval." Namibia Case, supra note 15, at 36. In fact, though the parties refused to
incorporate the right of nonrepatriation in the Convention explicitly, the diplomats
did agree that existing international practice was to be taken into consideration in all
situations where the Convention was applicable. Yoo 175. It is exactly such existing in-
ternational practice which now supports the right of a prisoner of war not to be for.
cibly repatriated. See pp. 369-73 infra.
Moreover, a survey of the diplomats' discussions reveals that they were concerned
with the problem of asylum for prisoners who did not want to be repatriated. The
doctrine of asylum, which entails allowing an alien to remain in one's territory, how-
ever, is not relevant to the present discussion of United States responsibility. Enemy
combatants captured by American forces are rarely kept in United States territory.
This does not extinguish American obligations in dealing with such prisoners. See
pp. 369-70 infra. It is the control over the prisoners, not their presence in American
territory, which is the basis of a claim on their part against the United States under
the Geneva Convention. In addition, as was the case in Korea, the granting of a pris.
oner's request for nonrefoulment does not necessarily involve allowing him to remain
in the state in which he was held prisoner. The right of the individual is only against
repatriation, not against being sent to any other state which will accept him and in
which he would be treated justly. The development of international law has included,
moreover, an abandonment by the nations of the absolute discretion to refuse re-
quests for nonrefoulnient. See pp. 369-71 infra; Weis, Territorial Asylum, 6 INDIAN J.
INT'L L., No. 2, at 181-87 (1966).
Even had due regard for such prevailing international law not been expressed, it
must be remembered that the intentions of the parties at the time of signing the cois-
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applied to circumstances not detailed, this total approach to assess-
ing the Convention is most important. The factors discussed pre-
viously strongly support the contention that an individual right was
created by the Geneva Convention for a prisoner of war to refuse
repatriation in order to prevent his own persecution. As a signatory
to the Convention, the United States is obligated to respect this in-
dividual option; a prisoner of war has the right to demand such
respect.
II. The Refugee Convention
After the Second World War, the global community developed a
unified interest in the aid and protection of refugees, abandoning
its previous reliance on bilateral treaties.39 One response to the dis-
location caused by this war was the 1951 Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees, 40 which outlined the standards of treatment for
refugees and recognized certain rights for their protection. In 1967,
a Protocol to the Convention 4' was opened which expanded its ap-
plication. 42 The United States, which had not been a party to the
original agreement, signed the Protocol in 1968.43
The important provision of the Convention is contained in Article
33: "No Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a refu-
gee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where
his life or freedom shall be threatened on account of his race, re-
ligion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or po-
litical opinion."4 4 Like the Geneva Convention, the Refugee Con-
vention is not strictly territorial in approach; its application does
vention are not the only factors to be considered in interpreting the agreement. Other
relevant considerations-the history and general purpose of the Convention, subsequent
conduct of the signatories, changes in circumstances, and development of international
law norms-support the individual right of the prisoner. See pp. 562-67 supra.
39. Fragomen, The Refugee: A Problem of Definition, 3 CASE W.J. INT'L L., No.
1, at 45, 47 (1970).
40. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, done July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.
150 [hereinafter cited as Refugee Convention].
41. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, done Jan. 31, 1967, [1968] 19 U.S.T.
6224, T.I.A.S. No. 6577.
42. The original Convention restricted its definition of refugees to those whose
displacement was caused by events prior to January 1, 1951. Refugee Convention,
supra note 40, ch. 1, art. 1, def. A (2), at 152. Partially for this reason the United
States had refused to become a party. The Protocol was drafted as a cure for this de-
fect by incorporating the original convention minus the deadline for displacing events
and some previous geographic restrictions. Protocol, supra note 41, art. I, at 6225. The
Protocol became effective November 1, 1968, for the United States.
43. It is the Convention Protocol which is therefore relevant to the present discussion.
Refugee Convention shall hereinafter refer to the covenant as amended by the 1967
Protocol.
44. Refugee Convention, supra note 40, art. 33, para. 1, at 176.
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not depend on aliens being within American territory nor does it
impose a duty on the United States to allow refugees to enter its
frontiers for the purpose of asylum. Though the travaux preparatoires
gave no conclusive answer as to whether Article 33 applied to refu-
gees other than those in the territory of a signatory,45 the wording
of the prohibition on refoulment supports an interpretation that
the covenant was to apply to any refugee within the control of a
contracting party.
40
The circumstances surrounding the drafting of the Convention
suggest a humanitarian intent to protect a broad range of refugees.
The Convention was written in a period when the vast displacement
of populations, the temporary governing of defeated nations by the
victorious, the growing communications among states, and the emer-
gence of individual rights in the international arena gave rise to a
concern for control over people rather than simply over territory.
In light of this background and the goal of refugee relief, the Con-
vention was surely not intended to limit the scope of a refugee's
protection against forcible return to a country at whose hands he
feardd persecution to the fortuitous circumstance of his successful
penetration of the territory of a Contracting State.47 It is rather
the control a nation may have over a refugee which makes the
Refugee Convention relevant to an action on its part which would
forcibly return that person "in any manner whatsoever" to a state
in which he would face persecution.
A. The Relationship of the Refugee Convention to the Geneva
Convention
It should be noted that the Refugee Convention represents a de-
velopment in international law which plays a role in the interpreta-
tion of the Geneva Convention. The interpretation of any conven-
tion requires an examination of the agreement in the context of the
general principles of that area of international law of which it is
45. See Weis, Territorial Asylum, supra note 38, at 183.
46. Under the maxim of treaty interpretation that words should not be considered
redundant, the restriction on the "[expulsion] or return [refoulment]" of a refugee
suggests that the Article's protection extended beyond those who were in a position to
be expelled from a party's territory. Supporting this conclusion is the equating of
"refouler" with "return" in the English text rather than with "expel." Refouler can
be translated in more than one way; it can mean to expel aliens, to refuse entry, to
drive back, or to force back. In order to avoid what would be a second redundancy
in the relevant sentence, it must be assumed refouler means something other than to
expel. All the other possible definitions refer to actions taken against those not already
within the territory of the acting state.
47. Weis, Territorial Asylum, supra note 38, at 183-84.
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part. The meanings of words and phrases are implicitly the result
of changing legal concepts and are grounded in changing legal doc-
trines, a fact repeatedly recognized by the signatories to the Geneva
Convention through diplomatic conferences, declarations, and Gen-
eral Assembly resolutions. 48 The recognition in the Refugee Con-
vention of the principle of nonrefoulment of individuals to territory
where they are threatened with persecution must be taken into ac-
count with respect to any application of the Geneva Convention
as well.
The Refugee Convention also reflected changed expectations among
the signatories in their abandonment of the claim to absolute dis-
cretion over whether to grant an alien's request for nonrefoulment.
The confusion of this concept with that of asylum had been the
most common argument against finding that the individual prisoner
under the Geneva Convention might claim a right of nonrepatriation
due to legitimate fears.
49
The demise of that argument permits an interpretation of the
Geneva Convention consonant with its humanitarian purpose, the
subsequent conduct and expectations of the parties, changed circum-
stances, and the requirements of current international law norms.
B. The Refugee Convention as a Separate Basis for the Prisoner's
Right
Before a prisoner of war captured by American forces can invoke
the protections of the Refugee Convention, he must successfully ex-
patriate himself and thus achieve refugee status. It has been argued,
in opposition to recognition of a right of expatriation, that the op-
tions available to a prisoner of war are limited by his continuing
military obligation to his country 0 and that whatever rights of ex-
patriation an individual may possess during times of peace are at-
tenuated during wartime. The prisoner's right of expatriation under
the Refugee Convention, therefore, depends upon his rights first
as a prisoner of war and then as an individual.
The school of thought which views the prisoner of war as a cap-
tive military representative of his government with no choice as to
expatriation and hence repatriation has been rejected both in theory
and practice. The premise was rejected on a theoretical basis by the
United States and other United Nations Command countries during
48. See pp. 361-62 & note 33 supra; Namibia Case, supra note 15, at 31-32.
49. See note 38 supra.
50. Vyshinsky Speech, supra note 12, at 88.
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the Korean War. Those countries instead stressed the theory that
the release and repatriation of prisoners of war required by the
Geneva Convention were two separate steps.51 If that is true the re-
leased prisoner is at one time in a position to expatriate himself
free of the complexities of his prisoner status. There is nothing
inherent in the military status of a person in itself to negate the in-
ternational right of expatriation, especially when hostilities have
ceased. More important, the practice of states toward prisoners of
war they have held negates any premise on their part that such pris-
oners have no rights of expatriation. Captor states have commonly
carried on programs to encourage prisoners to alienate themselves
from their native countries, programs which implicitly presuppose
recognition of a right of expatriation.52
Apart from the capacity a prisoner of war may have to disavow
his native state, as an individual in the international arena, he also
has analogous rights which have built upon and converged with
American policy to create current American obligations. The United
States has formally recognized the right of any person to expatriate
himself since 1868.53 Furthermore, the United States is bound by
its own law to recognize the right of a prisoner of war to expatriate
himself.54 Nor is it an impediment that the prisoner would thereby
lack affiliation with any state. Since the right of expatriation is an
inherent one, it is not dependent upon naturalization in a new
51. See pp. 362-63 supra.
52. HINcORAN't, supra note 35, at 210. In Vietnam the South Vietnamese openly admit-
ted indoctrinating prisoners of war, the Chien Hoi amnesty program being the most
benevolent and hence the most advertised means. For a description of this program see
Wosepkat, Repatriation and the Chieu Hoi Amnesty Approach in Vietnam: Conse-
quence and Prospects, 5 INT'L LAWYER 637 (1971).
53. An act of that year provided:
Whereas the right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all people . . .
Be it enacted . . . that any declaration, instruction, opinion, order or decision of
any officers of this government which denies, restricts, impairs or questions the
right of expatriation is hereby declared inconsistent with the fundamental prin-
ciples of this government.
Act of July 27, 1968, ch. 249, 15 Stat. 223, see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1481(a)(6), (7) (1970); cf.
MacKenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915); Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
54. At one time the United States denied the right of its own citizens to expatriate
themselves when the nation was at war. An Act in Reference to the Expatriation of
Citizens and their Protection Abroad, ch. 2534, § 2, 34 Stat. 1228 (1907). This quali-
fication was repealed by the Nationality Act of 1940, Act of Oct. 14, 1940, ch. 876,
§ 504, 54 Stat. 1172 (1940) (repealed by Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477, § 403(a)(42), 66
Stat. 280), is omitted from the current statutes on expatriation (8 U.S.C. § l81(a) (1970)),
and is "not now included in the American understanding of the doctrine." Liddel,
The United States Position in Regard to the "Right of Expatriation," 23 TEMPI'. L.Q.
325, 370 (1950). The current statute specifically provides for expatriation during wartime
for those remaining outside the country in order to evade or desert military service.
8 U.S.C. §§ 1481(a)(8), (10), 1483(a) (1970).
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country; by its exercise, the individual can separate himself from
his native country and become stateless.55
Beyond national law, however, the individual has the right under
international law to expatriate himself. For over a hundred years
the United States has viewed expatriation as an international right
of all people which cannot be abridged by any acts of the American
government56 It has likewise declared that all states are bound by
this right and has refused to recognize any contention that a native
state can make the option conditional. 5 The United States position
has developed wide, though not total, acceptance among other coun-
tries. By 1870, the British government abandoned its common law
rule that allegiance was nonrevokable and enough nations followed
suit that in 1924 the International Law Association gave formal ap-
proval to the American position. 5s Finally, the international com-
munity implicitly recognized the right of expatriation in the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, which included in
Article 15 that "no one shall be ...denied the right to change his
nationality.'' ;9
The United States' adherence to the concept of an international
right of expatriation is central to a repudiation of the theory that
an individual's right in this regard may be attenuated during times
of war. It is an established principle that international, not national,
law determines the relationship of an individual to a state and any
55. See Liddel, supra note 54, at 364. There is nonetheless some confusion in the
American case law with respect to whether naturalization in a new state is a pre-
requisite of renunciation of allegiance to one's native state. Compare Leong Kwai Yin
v. United States, 31 F.2d 738, 740 (9th Cir. 1929), with Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325,
34 (1939). Government officials have recognized that naturalization in a new country
is not a necessary precondition to expatriation. See Opinion of the Principal Executive
Officers of the Executive Department and Other Papers Relating to Expatriation,
Naturalization and Change of Allegiance, at 10 (1873), quoted in Liddel, supra note
54, at 357. Cf. the opinion of Attorney General Black in 1940 in which this theme was
leiterated. 9 Op. ATr'" GEN. 62 (1940). Thus, the individual's right to expatriate him-
self and the right of a state to decide whom to admit as immigrants and whom to
naturalize are distinct matters. See Liddel 355, 358, 364.
56. See p. 372 supra.
57. The American delegate to a Hague Conference on nationality, for example,
opposed an article which sought to deny renunciation of nationality until an ex-
patriation permit was granted by the native state on the grounds that it implied "an
admission that it is a reasonable and proper thing for a state to require its express
permission before one of its nationals can change his nationality .... .. " Flournoy,
Xationalily Convention, Protocols and Recommendations Adopted by the First Con-
ference on the Codification of International Law, 24 AM. J. INT'L L. 467, 473 (1930).
58. See Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on the Law of
Nationality (Comment on Article 13), 23 AM. J. INT'L L. 45, 47 (1929 Supp.).
59. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 15, G.A. Res. 217A, 3 U.N. GAOR
Supp. 535, 538, U.N. Doc. A/777 (1948). If the Declaration has assumed significance as
customary international law, the right of expatriation is thereby a binding norm. See
pp. 379-80 infra.
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national rules on expatriation must give way if there is a conflict.00
Whatever laws a nation may have in regard to the expatriation of
its nationals, those individuals have independent status and rights
in the international arena to abandon their prior allegiances and
obligations. Such a disparity between rights on national and inter-
national levels is not uncommon. When the native state has control
over its own national, it may decide to enforce its own domestic
laws; but when an individual is beyond the control of his native
state, as in the case of a prisoner of war, other nations are obligated
to respect his international rights. Since the principle of an absolute
international right of expatriation is recognized by the United States
and most other nations, the right cannot be attenuated during time
of war by a particular domestic law. Through the exercise of this
right, a prisoner of war, like any other alien outside his country,
may sever the ties to his native state.
While the right of a prisoner of war to expatriate himself is thus
clear, it is still necessary to establish that the expatriate prisoner
of war is protected by the Refugee Convention. If the prisoner ex-
ercised his right of expatriation in order to avoid repatriation for
fear of persecution, he has brought himself within the second defi-
nition of "refugee," as used in the Convention, which reads:
any person who . . . [,] owing to well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership
of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable, or, owing to such fear,
is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country ....
This definition is based, of course, upon such vague concepts as
a "well-grounded fear" and "persecution." Fear being a personal
emotion, "the circumstances and background of the person, his
psychological attitude and sensitivity toward his environment play
a role as well as the objective facts . ."6*-' In order to give some
substance to the definition, however, the United Nations Ad Hoc
Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems explained that
"well-founded fear" meant that "a person [had] either actually been
a victim of persecution or [could] show good reason why he fears
60. See Schwarzkopf v. Uhl, 137 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1943); Nottebohm Case, [1955]
I.C.J. 4; Flegenheimer Case (United States v. Italy), 5 Decisions Italian-United States
Conciliation Commission Case No. 20, Dec. No. 182 (1959).
61. Refugee Convention, supra note 40, ch. 1, art. 1, § A(2), at 152.
62. Weis, The Concept of the Refugee in International Law, 87 JOURNAL DE DRorr
INTERNATIONAL 928, 970 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Weis, The Concept of the Refugee].
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persecution."' 3 This definition, in turn, hinges upon what may be
considered persecution. According to Article 33 of the Refugee Con-
vention, the contracting parties are forbidden to send a refugee to
a territory where his life or liberty would be threatened on account
of the reasons outlined in the Convention; this would appear to be
one instance of persecution as used in the Convention's definition
of refugee. Other grievances, such as disregard for human dignity 4
or deprivation of economic opportunities,5 might also constitute
valid claims of persecution.
Recent declarations with respect to communist refugees have given
a broad meaning to the definition of possible persecution and have
recognized subjectively reasonable fears. On November 23, 1970, a
Lithuanian seaman jumped from a Russian ship onto an American
Coast Guard cutter and refused to be repatriated for fear that his
life or freedom would be put in danger. When the United States
forcibly returned him, the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, under his general competence to oversee the protection
of all international refugees, made it known that he considered such
an action a violation of the Refugee Convention. 0 When a Yugo-
slavian seaman sought to prevent his forced return to Yugoslav au-
thorities, based upon his demand for protection from persecution
under the Immigration and Naturalization Act, the Ninth Circuit
held that the standard for determining the likelihood of persecution
was not whether the alien could obtain some employment in his
home state; rather the inquiry must be whether he might suffer eco-
nomically for his political opinions.67 Whether a prisoner of war
who refused repatriation would be a refugee as defined by the Refugee
Convention is thus a question of fact, as any determination under the
63. Report of the Ad Hoc Conmittee on Statelessness and Related Problems, U.N.
Doc. E/1618, at 39 (1950). The substitution of a standard of a "good reason to fear"
for a "well-founded fear" does not resolve the definitional question. The terminology
of the Convention makes an objective enquiry difficult, for it outlines no standards
as to what may cause a justifiable fear, nor does it address itself to the issue of a
captor state encouraging such fear. Nonetheless, the Convention must be applied to
factual situations and the most logical solution appears to be that nations should
respect a plausible basis for fearing persecution as measured by the reasonable man
standard central to the law of torts.
64. Weis, The Concept of the Refugee, supra note 62, at 970.
65. The Immigration and Naturalization Act authorizes the Attorney General to with-
hold the deportation of an alien to any country where he would be subject to per-
%ecution because of race, religion, or political opinion. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1970). The
federal courts have interpreted this statute to include a wide range of conduct con-
stituting persecution, including incarceration, corporal punishment, and the deprivation
of economic opportunities. Fragomen, supra note 39, at 54 n.34.
66. N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1970, at 11, col. 1.
67. Kovac v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 407 F.2d 102 (9th Cir. 1969).
But see Cheng Kai Fu v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 386 F.2d 750 (2d Cir.
1967).
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Convention is. If his fear of persecution is well founded, he would
be covered by its protections.
It may be noted that the Convention's definition of refugee dif-
fers somewhat from the more common usage of the word in that it
draws no distinction between an individual who originally left his
country as part of its armed forces and one who fled as a result of
immediate possible danger. The Convention is applicable to any
person who is "outside the country of his nationality"; he need not
have left originally for any specific motive but only must be outside
the country and unwilling to return because of reasons within the
scope of the Convention.," The actions of the individual while out-
side his native state may themselves give rise to the well-founded
fear of persecution that entitles him to be considered a refugee,0 9 as
may be the case with a prisoner of war who openly disavows his
country. No viable distinction can be drawn which would separate
such prisoners from other refugees protected by the Convention.70
Once the prisoner of war who has reason to fear persecution in
his home country is recognized as a refugee under the Refugee Con-
vention, the protection he seeks against repatriation must also be
granted. By demonstrating that he has reasonable cause to fear for
his life or freedom on account of his race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership of a particular social group, or political opinion, he estab-
lishes a private right against the United States, as party to the Con-
vention, to refuse repatriation under Article 33. While that Article
is phrased in terms of prohibitions against the actions of contracting
68. See 'Weis, The Concept of the Refugee, supra note 62, at 972.
69. See Fragomen, supra note 39, at 55.
70. See Charmatz & Wit, supra note 3, at 408. Such reasoning has been reflected in
the practice of the Soviet Union, which, while rejecting the right of any citizen to
nonrepatriation, has never separated prisoners of war from the general category of
Soviet citizens, refugees, and displaced persons. See Ginsburgs, The Soviet Union and
the Problem of Refugees and Displaced Persons, 1917-1956, 51 A',t. J. INT'L L. 325, 359
(1957). Section F of Article 1 of the Refugee Convention does exclude those who there
is reason to believe are guilty of war crimes, crimes against humanity or peace, or
acts contrary to the purposes of the United Nations. Admittedly, those guilty of war
crimes may not be entitled to the total protection of the Refugee Convention, just as
they do not receive full benefits from the Geneva Convention; but such persons are
only a small percentage of prisoners of war. As to crimes against peace and hu-
inanity, the position of the American government is that these charges are not
usually applicable to general combatants but apply instead to national leaders who
plan and initiate wars. AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INsTIrrTE, THE PRISONER OF ,WAR PROBLEM
19, Analysis No. 26 (1970) [hereinafter cited as AEI]. The standard of exclusion
for acts contrary to the purposes of the United Nations is very obscure and ap-
parently has never been applied. It was interpreted by many of the delegates to the
diplomatic conference to apply only to those who collaborated with enemies of the
United Nations during the Second World War. Weis, The Concept of the Refugee,
supra note 62, at 986. In regard to any of these exceptions, it must be remembered
that the Convention should be interpreted in compliance with its general purpose of
extending protection to the vast majority of the world's refugees.
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states, its benefits inure to the individual and can theoretically be
invoked by him through Article 16;71 a personal international right
can thus be asserted.
III. Customary International Law
International rights and obligations often develop through less
formal, specific channels than the modality of interstate agreements
which characterizes conventional international law. In fact, these
agreements often reflect what has already become binding through
the evolution of customary law standards. Customary law is formed
by the continuous, uniform conduct of nations in a way that creates
expectations that such conduct will continue in the future and is
required by international law.72
By their actions, declarations, and policies, the governing elites of
nation states create expectations that such particular conduct is oblig-
atory; the expectations created substitute for a formal written agree-
ment officially binding all nations which become parties. An exami-
nation of governments' past actions, agreements, and statements re-
veals the prevalent expectation of two evolved norms which have
ripened into felt international obligations of the United States: (1)
An individual may possess personal rights against a state under in-
ternational law; (2) There should be no forced return of aliens to
states in which they would be persecuted for their beliefs, race, or
status. These two norms, in combination, constitute the prisoner of
war's right of nonrepatriation.
A. Personal Rights Under International Law
Traditionally, only nation states were considered subjects of in-
ternational law and hence able to possess international rights. The
trend away from this view began, to a significant degree, immediately
after World War II-most notably with the Charter of the United
Nations. 73 The Charter was followed in 1948 by the Universal Dec-
71. "A refugee shall have free access to the courts of law . . . of all contracting
States." Refugee Convention, supra note 40, art. 16.
72. See The Lotus Case, [1927] P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 9, at 18.
73. Tucker, Has the Individual Become the Subject of International Law?, 34 U. CIN.
L. Rrv. 341, 357 (1965). In the Preamble to the Charter, the "peoples of the United
Nations . . . [reaffirmed their] faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women .... " Article One
asserts as a purpose of the United Nations the development of respect for "the prin-
ciple of equal rights and self-determination of peoples" and for "human rights and
fundamental freedom." U.N. CHARTER ch. I, art. 1, paras. 2, 3.
The Yale Law Journal
laration of Human Rights, 74 which was intended to be a clear recog-
nition that the individual possessed certain universal rights, recog-
nized in the international arena, which derived independently of
the laws of his native state. It was significant in this respect that
the provisions of the Declaration were not phrased as limitations on
state action but as specific, positive, personal rights.
The principle of private international rights has since been recog-
nized on numerous occasions by the global community. The United
Nations has produced a number of conventions which recognize the
individual as a possessor of international rights: among others, the
Refugee Convention, the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights, 75 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights,76 and those on statelessness, 77 slavery,78 and forced
labor.79 In addition, a number of United Nations declarations, in-
cluding the Declaration on Territorial Asylum,80 the Declaration of
the Rights of the Child,81 the Declaration on the Granting of Inde-
pendence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,8 2 and the Declaration
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 3 ac-
knowledge the individual as a subject of international law. As a result
of this flow of agreements and statements, the principle that the in-
dividual holds personal rights in the international arena has devel-
oped into a customary norm.84
B. The Right Against Forcible Return to Territories of Likely
Persecution
One of the customary norms an individual, as a subject of inter-
national law, has a right to rely upon is the expectation against forced
repatriation where the alien has a valid fear of persecution in his
home country. Resolutions subscribed to by the global community,
74. See note 59"supra.
75. G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 52, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1966).
76. Id. at 49.
77. Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, done September 28, 1954,
360 U.N.T.S. 117.
78. Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and
Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, done September 7, 1956, 266 U.N.T.S. 3.
79. Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, adopted June 25, 1957,
320 U.N.T.S. 291; see Svarlien, International Law and the Individual, 4 J. PUB. L. 138
(1955).
80. G.A. Res. 2312, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 81, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967).
81. G.A. Res. 1386, 14 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 19, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1959).
82. G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 66, U.N. Doe. A/4684 (1960).
83. G.A. Res. 1904, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. 15, at 35, U.N. Doe. A/5515 (1963).
84. See P. Jassui., A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 15-17 (1968); Tucker, supra note 73,
at 366.
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such as those passed in the General Assembly of the United Nations,
have played a significant role in the evolution of this principle., 5
Resolution 610 (VII), which gave rise to the expectation against forced
repatriation in the context of the Korean Armistice agreement on
the exchange of prisoners, has been discussed above.8 6 Of greater
importance has been the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,87
which serves as the foundation for the entire range of international
protection for the individual. While the Declaration does not deal
expressly with forced repatriation, the totality of its articles reflects
a standard of protection from the persecution that such a forced
return would entail.85 If a prisoner of war or any individual could
claim that, upon his forced repatriation, such rights would be denied
him by his native state due to his beliefs, race, or status, he would
be asserting a threatened breach of the Declaration's stipulation that
"[e]veryone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in
this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as . . . re-
ligion, political or other opinion, national or social origin .... ",
Moreover, the repatriating state, by forcing the alien to return home
in the face of such probable results, would be violating its obligation
"by progressive measures, national and international, to secure [the]
universal and effective recognition and observance" of these rights. 90
Originally, the Declaration was seen simply as a statement of prin-
ciples approved by the global community as a common standard of
achievement;"' but "[i]n the years since 1948 [it] has acquired a pur-
85. While resolutions and declarations are not binding in the same sense that treaties
are, they can accelerate the growth of a customary norm. By declaring that a certain
principle is binding, a resolution avoids the necessity of continuous state practice to
show uniform approval and a belief on the part of states that they must act according
to that principle: "[Tjogether with prior and subsequent conforming conduct, the
resolution 'creates' a customary law by fulfilling the precondition of recognition."
Bleicher, The Legal Significance of Re-Citation of General Assembly Resolutions, 63
Am. J. INT'L L. 445, 450 (1969). See also A Memorandum of the Office of Legal Affairs
to the Committee on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/ L. 610 (1962). Cf. 0. AsAmOAH,
THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DECLARATIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE
UNITED NATIONS 47-63 (1966); E. SCHWELB, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMs-
MUNITY 70 (1964) [hereinafter cited as SCHWELB]; Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on
Outer Space: "Instant" International Customary Law?, 5 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 23, 36-46
(1965).
86. See p. 366 supra.
87. See note 59 supra.
88. The Declaration states that everyone has a right to "life, liberty and the se-
curity of person" (Article 3), "to freedom of thought, conscience and religion" (Article
18), to "freedom of opinion and expression" (Article 19), and "to leave any country"
(Article 13); moreover "[n]o one shall be held in slavery or servitude" (Article 4) and
"[n]o one shall be subjected to . . . cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment" (Article 5).
89. Id. Article 2, § 1.
90. Id. Preamble.
91. Aries, International Human Rights and Their Implementation, 19 GEo. WASH.
L. REa. 579, 593 (1951).
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pose different from the one which was contemplated and willed by
many of the governments that brought it into being .... It was the
international community .. . that used the Declaration . .. [and]
through unplanned, haphazard action ... invested [it] with an in-
creased . . .authority and practical importance. -9 2 The Declaration
has been incorporated into numerous conventions, declarations, and
even some state constitutions as a universal standard. 93 As a result
of this constant and widespread recognition, the Declaration has as-
sumed the nature of customary international law,04 a development
proclaimed by the Montreal Assembly of Human Rights in 1968.1'1
The implicit right to refuse repatriation to territories of probable
persecution has therefore likewise become an established norm.
Conventions, too, play a role in the formation of customary law,
not because they codify a principle which might not otherwise be
binding but because they help to create expectations of state action.
These expectations are in turn the basis of customary standards which
are obligatory on all nations, not just those party to the convention.
The Refugee Convention fulfilled this function in regard to repa-
triation of aliens facing persecution, a result recognized by the later
Conference on Stateless Persons.0 6
As discussed above the Geneva Convention and its application had
92. SCHWELD, supra note 85, at 37.
93. By 1967, for instance, the Declaration had been incorporated in 75 United Na-
tions resolutions. Bleicher, supra note 85, at 444. In two cases the General Assembly
gave the Declaration equal standing with the Charter and resolved unanimously that
both were binding provisions of international law. The 1960 Declaration on Colonialism,
supra note 82, stated that "all states shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of
the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
present convention." The 1963 Declaration on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
supra note 82, included a similar provision. The Declaration on Colonialism is of special
significance because it included an elaborate enforcement mechanism which demonstrates
that it was more than a statement of principle. The 1962 vote reaffirming the Declara-
tion on Colonialism amounted therefore to an agreement by the global community to
be bound by its provisions, including compliance with the Universal Declaration. See
A. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD 28 (1972); SCHWELB, supra note 85, at
68-70; Waldock, Human Rights in Contemporary International Law and the Significance
'of the European Convention, INT'L & Comp. L.Q. Sop'P. No. 11, at 1, 13, 14 (1965).
For the rule that states abstaining in a vote on a resolution declaring customary law
are considered bound by the resulting resolution, see Bleicher, supra note 85, at 451.
The acceptance of the Declaration as a definition of the term "human rights" as
used in the Charter, cf. Bleicher 462, has also supported its binding character since
the Charter has been ruled to be an obligatory international document on those na-
tions that signed it. Namibia Case, supra note 15, at 715.
94. See A. ROBERTSON, supra note 93, at 28; Waldock, supra note 93, at 14; cf. Bleicher
458-65.
95. The Assembly formally acknowledged that "the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights . . . has over the years become a part of customary international law." U.N.
Doc. A/Conf. 32/28, at 2, quoted in A. ROBERTSON, supra note 93, at 28 n.14.
96. A conference resolution stated "that Article 33 of the Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees of 1951 is an expression of [a] generally accepted principle ... 
Conference on Stateless Persons, U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 17/5, at 5 (1954).
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a central role in the initial development of the concept that a person
might have a right, under certain circumstances, to refuse to be re-
turned to his native state. The controversy concerning the Conven-
tion's application gave rise during the Korean War negotiations to
official statements by members of the international community which
created expectations of state conduct. Forced repatriation was de-
clared repugnant not only to the humanitarian purpose of the Con-
vention 97 but also to the ideals of justice and liberty" and to the
totality of values of the free world.99 The United States even went
so far as to declare it illegal. 10
Finally, state domestic law and practice have created expectation*
of limitations on forcible repatriation. In some nations there has de-
veloped a concurrent acceptance of the right of an alien to territorial
asylum. In Germany, for example, persons who are refugees as defined
in the Refugee Convention are granted asylum under national law.1'0
While the United States, in common with other nations, has not in-
corporated a right of asylum into national law, it has recognized its
responsibility to aliens threatened with persecution in the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Act. 102 Whether required by national law
or not, moreover, almost all nations have consistently granted at
least temporary asylum to aliens fleeing political persecution. 1°3 So
consistent has this state policy been, in fact, that nonrepatriation of
aliens threatened with persecution has become a binding customary
international norm.1
0 4
The development of customary international law thus reveals recog-
nition by the global community of the principle against repatriation
of aliens to territories in which they face persecution. This norm
does not rest in its application upon the status of the alien. It is
irrelevant in this context whether the protection is considered a pro-
97. See note 20 supra.
98. Yoo, supra note 13, at 171.
99. Speech by British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, in Charmatz & Wit, supra
note 3, at 392.
100. In a speech before the Political and Security Committee of the United Nations
in 1952, Secretary of State Dean Acheson said, "So far as I know, there has been no
member of the United Nations outside the Communist group that has ever suggested
that it was right, proper, legal or necessary to return [Korean] prisoners by force. ....
[I] would be highly immoral and illegal to force these prisoners to return ....
D. ACiESON, supra note 1, at 30.
101. Asylum Ordinance of January 6, 1953, [1953] BGBI I3.
102. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1970).
103. Krenz, The Refugee as a Subject of International Law, 15 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
90, 108 (1967).
104. See id. at 104 for the view that uniform practice by states constitutes another
source of international law principles as recognized by Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice-"the general principle of law recognized by civilized
nations."
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hibition against state action or a direct right of the individual. It
can only be claimed by the individual prisoner himself, once he has
rejected his native state, which would normally represent his claims
in the international arena. The ability of the prisoner of war to
make such claims directly has been recognized by the concurrent
customary norm that the individual may possess rights apart from
those of any particular state.105
IV. Conclusion
Since World War II most nations which have been parties to armed
conflicts have respected the requests of prisoners of war not to be
repatriated at the end of hostilities. Nevertheless, the prisoner of war
remains in a precarious position with respect to forced repatriation
as long as doctrine recognizes in the captor state discretion over the
matter, for his fate may thus be determined by political necessities.
For this reason the United States should recognize a personal right
in prisoners of war captured by it to refuse repatriation to territory
where they would face persecution.
It is important, moreover, that the United States take the formal
105. There are two further concepts of international law closely related to the
principle of nonrepatriation which should at least be noted. The first is the ideal of
human dignity, discussed at p. 366 supra. If this ideal, which has become a norm
of the international community, prohibits forced repatriation of an alien, such action
would deprive him of fundamental rights.
Secondly, the right of a threatened prisoner of war to refuse repatriation draws sub-
stance from the role of equity in settling issues of international law. The applicability
of equity to international controversies is recognized in Article 38, paragraph 2, of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice, and "a decision-maker is thus not con-
fined in determination of lawfulness, to explicit agreements or inferences from prior
customary behavior, but may draw creatively upon a great variety of principles, prece-
dents, analogies and considerations of fairness." H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL
LEGAL PROBLEMS 207 n.36 (1968). As Professor Myres McDougal has pointed out, "[F]or
all types of controversies, the one test that decision-makers have in fact invoked and
applied is that simple and ubiquitous, but indispensable, standard of what, considering
all relevant policies and variables in context, is reasonable .... ." McDougal, Editorial
Comment: The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the International Law of the Sea, 49 Amt.
J. INT'L L. 356, 359 (1955).
In the context of the present discussion, the principle of equity would dictate against
repatriating prisoners of war who have deserted during imprisonment. Captor states
commonly pursue an active program of encouraging desertion among prisoners of war,
the most current example of which is the Chieu Hoi program in Vietnam and its
Communist counterpart. See p. 367 supra. To surrender such a prisoner, who is
either a political refugee or a deserter who has renounced his allegiance on express
or implied promises of protection, would be both a breach of good faith on the part
of the captor state and a violation of the international principles of equity. See
HINGORANI, supra note 35, at 213; Schapiro, Repatriation of Deserters, 29 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 311, 323 (1952).
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step of declaring its recognition of that right. Such declaration at
this time would serve multiple purposes. First, since it could be
rendered during a period of relative peace for American military
forces, discussion of the principle would not be impeded by the
political ramifications of a war in which the United States was cap-
turing and losing prisoners of war. In this freer atmosphere, a dec-
laration would be instrumental in furthering the global community's
recognition of the right and would undoubtedly lead to a dialogue
which would further clarify the details of its application. Second,
in the event that the United States became involved in later war,
this prior declaration of a prisoner's right would facilitate its exer-
cise. Many prisoners with valid justification to refuse repatriation
might be hesitant to assert their claims unless they were certain of
success, especially since the means of enforcement are limited'00 and
a denial of the request would almost certainly mean punishment in
their home country. Finally, the declaration would clarify the pro-
tection which the American government expected its military au-
thorities (and those of any nations to which it transferred prisoners)
to accord prisoners of war they captured, thus promoting the practical
realization of the right's observance. Regardless of what American
authorities might do behind the scenes in fulfilling the nation's re-
sponsibility in this respect, the absence of a clear recognition and
declaration of the right of nonrepatriation by the American govern-
ment would confuse its position on the subject and undoubtedly af-
106. As compared to domestic law, there are obvious difficulties in regard to the
enforcement of international rights. This is especially true when rights are those of
an individual instead of a state. With the exception of the European human rights
court, individuals usually have no standing before one of the important mediums of
enforcement-international tribunals. This does not mean their rights do not exist, but
it does mean that for some violations of an individual right there may be no direct
personal remedy. See Tucker, supra note 73, at 344.
The difficulties of enforcement of private rights seem even more incongruous with
respect to a right which can be personally invoked by an individual, such as the
prisoner of war. The distinction which should be kept in mind is between the right
to invoke an international claim and the effective power to enforce it.
The picture is certainly not totally bleak. In all probability, the United States would
abide by its obligations to respect his right in order to continue its efforts to live up
to its international obligations and to prevent adverse public opinion and criticism
domestically and internationally.
It might be added that the United States need create no burden for itself by re-
specting the prisoner's claim. In situations such as Vietnam, the nation in which the
captive was held is willing to allow him to remain in its territory and eventually
become a citizen. Even were this not so, the United States would be under no obli-
gation to grant the prisoners asylum in American territory. The United Nations Office
of the High Commissioner for Refugees was created to handle displaced persons such
as these and to facilitate their transfer to other nations. See Statute of the Office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, G.A. Res. 428, 5 U.N. GAOR
Supp. 2, U.N. Doc. A/1750, 1751 (1950).
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fect the likelihood that the right would be both demanded and re-
spected.
The ambiguities which may attend the application'07 of this doc-
trine make it even more important that the United States understand
its responsibilities before it is again involved in a military action in
which prisoners of war are captured, so that it can take the necessary
steps from the outset to ensure that the right of nonrepatriation is
supported.
107. United States participation in the Vietnam War raised practical questions in-
volved in application of the right of nonrepatriation of prisoners captured in a guerrilla
conflict. An immediate issue is the transfer of prisoners captured by American forces
to the client state's control. It appears likely that the prisoners may assert personal
rights against the United States, including nonrepatriation, under such circumstances.
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